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Introduction
The banking crisis that erupted in 2007 and triggered the Great Recession of 2009 has led many economists and policy-makers to question the standard New Keynesian model of the economy on the grounds that it can neither account for the crisis nor shed any light on banking behaviour since it has no banking sector. In its defence it can be said that it has been shown to give a good account of the US economy's business cycle behaviour in recent years, including the crisis period-Liu and Minford (2012) ; furthermore if shifts in the trend of potential output are added to the model, it can give a good account of the overall behaviour since the crisis, including the permanent e¤ects of such shifts in trend - Le, Meenagh and Minford (2012) . However, the absence of a banking sector remains a serious gap since clearly banking shocks contributed to the recent crisis in a material way. Accordingly, in this paper we explore how far adding a banking sector, based on recent work of De Fiore and Tristani (2009),
We are grateful to Huw Dixon and Paul de Grauwe for helpful comments. 1 can improve the standard model's …t to the US data and also how this extended model accounts for the recent behaviour of the US economy.
To anticipate, we …nd that this extended model improves on the standard model substantially and also attributes around two thirds of the output recession to banking. This result, as we have already said, applies to the business cycle part of the data-to give an overall account of the crisis one must also add in the e¤ects of trend shifts which we do not deal with here. Nevertheless, the empirical result is striking, even if perhaps it should not be surprising to policy-makers.
In the rest of this paper, we …rst set out the standard and extended models; in the third section we explain our testing procedures which are based on indirect inference, whereby a model is judged by its ability in simulation to replicate behaviour found in the data; in the fourth we set out our results for the usual calibrated versions of these models; in the …fth section we reestimate the models to get them as close as possible to the data and test these reestimated versions. The last section concludes, relating our work to other work of this type and drawing some policy implications.
The Models
The standard New Keynesian model includes a standard aggregate demand equation, an aggregate supply function, and a policy rule equation, as follows:
(1)
whereỸ t is the output gap, t is the rate of in ‡ation, R t is the nominal interest rate, and " 1t , " 2t , and u t are the demand error, supply error and policy error respectively. These errors are assumed to be autoregressive processes with the coe¢ cients calculated from the sample estimates. Equation 
A Model with Credit: Adding a Banking Sector
We follow De Fiore and Tristani (2009) in their adaptation of this model to include a credit channel. They assume that …rms producing homogeneous goods for the wholesale market consist of risk-neutral entrepreneurs who produce with inputs of labour and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. They have to pay workers in advance of production by raising external …nance from banks. It is assumed that the …nancial market is imperfect, with asymmetric information and costly state veri…cation (see Townsend, 1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985) ; there is a risk of default on their debts because of their idiosyncratic shocks. Perfectly competitive banks lend to them on debt contracts that are the optimal under this set-up.
The timing of the economy is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the …nancial market opens with the aggregate shocks. Households then make their portfolio decisions by allocating their wealth (including existing assets, bond and deposits). The banks keep these deposits, which are used to …nance the production of …rms. Each wholesale …rm stipulates a contract with a bank in order to pay their labour costs. In the second period, the goods market opens. Wholesale …rms produce homogeneous goods, which are then sold to the retail sector. If pro…ts are adequate to repay the debt, then the …rms will place the remaining revenues into the …nancing of entrepreneurial consumption. If the revenues are not su¢ cient to repay the debt, then they will default and their production is seized by the banks. Firms in the retail sector buy the homogeneous goods from wholesale entrepreneurs in a competitive market and they use them to produce di¤erentiated goods at no cost. Retail …rms have some market power due to the di¤erentiation of their goods. However, they are not free to change their price because prices are subject to Calvo contracts. The retail goods are then purchased both by households and wholesale entrepreneurs for their own consumption. Everything in this model is standard to the New Keynesian model apart from the banking contract. In the wholesale sector, the …rms (indexed by i) are owned by entrepreneurs, who face a linear technology production function that is speci…ed as:
where A t is an aggregate productivity shock and ! i;t is an idiosyncratic productivity shock with log-normal distribution function and density function . This production function can be seen as an abstraction from capital accumulation which forms the basis of the credit need in the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) model. In De Fiore and Tristani's model, it is assumed that each …rm receives a constant endowment of internal funds at the beginning of each period; but these funds are insu¢ cient to …nance their desired level of production so that they must borrow from the banks. These charge an interest rate spread over the risk-free rate, re ‡ecting the resulting default risk.
Firms pay wages by raising external …nance before pro…ting from the sale of retail goods. The …nancial contract is stipulated with the banks before observing the idiosyncratic productivity shock but after observing aggregate shocks. The amount of external …nance is P t (x i;t ), which means that the total funds at hand are P t x i;t = P t x t since all …rms are identical. Since these wholesale …rms are perfectly competitive and operate under constant returns to scale, they make zero pro…ts in equilibrium and borrow the full amount of their wage bill as dictated by aggregate demand.
The terms on which they can do this are dictated by the bank contract. The banks, also perfectly competitive, will lend at a spread that gives them an expected return equal to their cost of deposits, R t : This must compensate for the risk of default which rises with the size of the loan (=the wage bill) and the risk-free rate. As the wage bill (i.e. the value of employment) rises, the size of possible bankruptcy rises and with it the credit spread. As the risk-free rate rises, the banks'cost of funds rises and this is passed on to …rms; because this higher cost makes it harder for the …rms to pay back the funds, default probabilities rise. Unlike the credit contract of Bernanke et al (1999) , which is for investment, the contract here is for working capital. ie for production itself. Bank funding is therefore a cost of production that a¤ects in ‡ation.
The logic of the bank contract works as follows. The …rm needs enough funds to pay for its wage bill, ie its direct production costs, for producing the goods required for equilibrium aggregate demand. Since it has limited funds, the total funds it needs de…nes its required leverage. For the bank to supply this leverage it requires. for a given pro…t rate of the …rm, a certain bankruptcy threshold, which rises with rising leverage; the combination of this leverage and the threshold de…ne for this rate of pro…t what the bank must charge as a risk-spread on top of the risk-free interest rate.
The details are as follows: the threshold ! is given by the equation for the bank's zero pro…t conditions as g(!; ) [the bank's expected share of …rm pro…ts net of bankruptcy monitoring costs] = ( x x ) R q where the threshold rises with required funds, x, the risk-free rate, R, and it falls with the pro…t rate the …rm makes, q. The interest rate the …rm will pay on its loan relative to its pro…t rate is in turn given by z q = !( x x ) which can be thought of as measuring the burden of funding costs on the …rm. For the …rm to be willing to pay these costs the burden must be lowered su¢ ciently by a rise in the pro…t rate, which lowers !: The optimal contract is set where q is large enough to optimise the …rm's expected pro…ts after paying the funding costs-as …rms have free entry under perfect competition this will in the long run (ie steady state) also be the zero net pro…t point where the …rm's costs including funding just equal its revenues.
After successive substitutions to reduce it to a small compact form, the credit model can be written in loglinearised form as:
where t ; R t ,^ t represent in ‡ation, nominal interest rate, and credit spread, respectively; 1t , 2t and 3t represent the demand, supply, and credit market shocks, respectively, and u t the policy shock. It is assumed that the four errors are AR(1) processes. Equation 5 is the new version of the IS curve; it now also depends on the credit spread and the nominal interest rate (the latter re ‡ecting entrepreneurial pro…ts which are correlated positively with the cost of …nance). Equation 6 is the extended Phillips Curve: here the nominal interest rate and credit spread now enter as cost factors. Equation 7 is the reduced form for the credit spread. This increases with aggregate demand as this raises the funds requirement. It falls with the nominal interest rate because for a given funds requirement this makes funds more expensive; given …rms' capacity to pay is set by aggregate demand conditions, the spread has to fall for them to be able to a¤ord the same amount of credit. Equation 8 is the policy rule that is used in this model, unchanged from the standard model.
The Testing Procedure
Indirect Inference provides a framework for judging whether a model with a particular set of parameters could have generated the behaviour found in a set of data. The procedure provides a statistical criterion for rejecting the model as the data generating mechanism.
Indirect inference has been well known in the estimation literature, since being introduced by Smith (1993); see also Smith (1991, 1993) , Gourieroux et al. (1993) , Gourieroux and Montfort (1995) and Canova (2005). In indirect estimation the behaviour of the data is …rst described by some atheoretical time-series model such as a Vector Auto Regression, the 'auxiliary model'; then the parameters of the structural model are chosen so that this model when simulated generates estimates of the auxiliary model as close as possible to those obtained from actual data. It chooses the structural parameters that can minimise the distance between some function of these two sets of estimates. In what follows we give a brief account of the method; a full account, together with Monte Carlo experiments checking its accuracy and power and comparing it with other methods in use for evaluating DSGE models, can be found in Le, Meenagh, Minford and Wickens (LMMW, 2011 and 2012).
The test is based on the comparison of the actual data with the data simulated from the structural model through an auxiliary model. We choose a VAR as our auxiliary model and base our tests on the VAR coe¢ cients and also the variances (of the variables in the VAR). The reason for choosing a VAR as the auxiliary model is that a DSGE model like the ones here have as their solution a restricted vector autoregressive-moving-average (VARMA), which can be closely represented by a VAR. The VAR captures the dynamic inter-relationships found in the data between the variables of the model. The test statistic is based on the joint distribution of the chosen descriptors-here the VAR coe¢ cients and the variances. The null hypothesis is that the macroeconomic model is the data generating mechanism.
The test statistic for this joint distribution is a Wald statistic Following the notation of Canova (2005), y t is de…ned as an m 1 vector of observed data (t = 1; :::; T ) and x t ( ) is an m 1 vector of simulated data with S observations from the model, is a k 1 vector of structural parameters from the model. We set S = T , because we want to compare simulated data and actual data using the same size of sample. y t and x t ( ) are assumed to be stationary and ergodic.
The
is the vector of descriptors. Under the null hypothesis H 0 : = 0 , the auxiliary model is then
. The null hypothesis is tested through the q 1 vector of continuous functions g( ). Under the null hypothesis, g( ) = g( ( 0 )). a T is de…ned as the estimator of using actual data and S ( 0 ) as the estimator of based on simulated data for 0 . Then we have g(a T ) and g( S ( 0 )):The simulated data is obtained by bootstrapping N times of structural errors, so there are N sets of simulated data. We can calculate the bootstrapped mean by
where W ( 0 ) is the variance-covariance matrix of the bootstrapped distribution of g(a S ) __________ g( S ( 0 )) . Here we use a, the descriptors themselves, as g(a). The testing procedure involves three steps. The …rst step is to back out the structural errors from the observed data and parameters of the model. If the model equations have no future expectations, the structural errors can be simply calculated using the actual data and structural parameters. If there are expectations in the model equations, we calculate the rational expectation terms using the robust instrumental variables methods of McCallum (1976) and Wickens (1982) ; we use the lagged endogenous data as instruments and hence use the auxiliary VAR model as the instrumental variables regression. The errors are treated as autoregressive processes; their autoregressive coe¢ cients and innovations are estimated by OLS. 1 Secondly, these innovations are then bootstrapped and the model is solved by Dynare. The innovations are repeatedly drawn by time vector to preserve any contemporaneous correlations between them. By this method we obtain N (usually set at 1000) sets of simulated data, or bootstrap samples. These represent the sampling variation of the data implied by the structural model.
Finally, we compute the Wald statistic. By estimating the VAR on each bootstrap sample, the distribution of the VAR coe¢ cients and data variances is obtained, the . Thus, the estimates of from the data and the model estimates can be compared. We examine separately the model's ability to encompass the dynamics (the VAR coe¢ cients) and the volatility (the variances) of the data. We show where in the Wald bootstrap distribution the Wald based on the data lies (the Wald percentile).
We use a VAR(1) as the auxiliary model. With a VAR(1), contains 12 elements, the 9 VAR coe¢ cients and the 3 data variances. This number of descriptors provides a strong requirement for the structural model to match. Raising the VAR order would increase the number of VAR coe¢ cients (eg with a VAR(2) the number would double to 18, making 21 elements in in total); the requirement of the test arguably becomes excessive, since we do not expect our structural models to replicate data dynamics at such a high level of re…nement.
The steps above detail how a given model, with particular parameter values, is tested. These values would typically be obtained in the …rst place by calibration. However, the power of the test is high and the model will be rejected if the numerical values chosen for the parameters are inaccurate. Therefore, to test a model fully one needs to examine its performance for all (theoretically permissible) values of these parameters. This is where we introduce Indirect Estimation; in this we search for the numerical parameter values that minimise the Wald statistic. For this purpose we use a powerful algorithm due to Ingber (1996) based on Simulated Annealing in which search takes place over a wide range around the initial values, with optimising search accompanied by random jumps around the space. After reestimating the model in this way, we then test it on these values. If it is rejected on these, then the model itself is rejected, as opposed merely to its calibrated parameter values.
Data, Calibration and Results for Calibrated Models

Data
We apply the models to quarterly US data from 1981Q4 to 2010Q4 on the output gap (Ỹ t ), the in ‡ation rate ( t ), and the interest rate (R t ), collected from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The data include the recent …nancial crisis as far availability permits. The output gap (Ỹ ) is de…ned as the percentage gap between real GDP and potential GDP, for which we use the HP …lter. In ‡ation ( ) is de…ned as the quarterly change in the log of the CPI. The interest rate is the federal funds rate, expressed as a fraction per quarter. t and R t are linearly detrended. The credit spread is the di¤erence between the bank prime loan rate (R l ) and risk free rate (R). It is notably volatile in the early 1980s, a turbulent period. With in ‡ation in double digits, Paul Volcker was appointed as Fed chairman in 1979 to bring it under control. With the resulting policies, which included spells of both monetary base and credit controls, interest rate volatility reached a peak, not exceeded even in the recent bank crisis. This usefully puts into a longer term context the extent to which the banking shocks in the recent crisis were not pathologically extreme. Figure 1 displays the time paths of the four variables in the sample period after detrending. Table 1 gives the ADF test results, which also con…rm they are all strictly stationary after detrending. 
The VAR's nine coe¢ cients represent the dynamic properties found in the data. We also look at the volatility properties as indicated by the variances. We consider these two properties both separately and together, calculating Wald statistics for each. We show these as the percentile where the data Wald lies in the Wald bootstrap distribution. The Table 3 shows the results for the standard model. The …rst column lists the parameters of the VAR (which represent the dynamic inter-relationships in the data) in the upper part, the data variances (representing the volatility in the data) in the second part and overall Wald percentiles for each aspect, dynamics, volatility, and overall for both together in the third part. The second column shows the values in the data, the third and fourth show the 95% bounds implied by the DSGE model, the …fth recording whether the data values are inside or outside these bounds. What can be seen is that the standard model is on the borderline of rejection for the dynamics, easily accepted on the volatility, and accepted overall.
Calibrating and Testing the Standard New Keynesian Model
Categories
Actual Table 4 lists the calibrated values in the credit model, as in De Fiore and Tristani (2009). The …rm's idiosyncratic shock has a log-normal distribution with mean and standard deviation calibrated so as to ensure the quarterly steady state credit spread is equal to 0.5% and 1% bankruptcy rate for each quarter. Table 5 shows for the credit model the equivalent test results shown above for the standard model. It can be seen that the credit model is easily accepted on the dynamics, not so easily accepted as the standard model on the volatility, and somewhat more easily accepted overall. Thus, like the standard model, the credit model is accepted by the data overall. 2 
Calibrating and Testing the Credit Model
Parameters
De…nitions
Values discount factor 0. It does however get closer to the data overall than the standard model. The table 6 presents the comparison of the two models in terms of their p-values, which measure the probability that each model gets as close as it does to the data (in percent they are simply 100 minus the Wald percentiles). It can be seen that except on volatility the credit model is closer than the standard model to the behaviour of the data. Nevertheless it is also clear that the credit model now dominates the standard model by a substantial margin in all aspects. Table 11 shows the comparative p-values of the two reestimated models. Overall, the credit model is roughly three times more probable. This shows how each shock individually contributes to each variable's variance, assuming that they are independent. However, our bootstraps draw shocks in time vectors, to preserve any mutual dependence; the shocks' resulting interaction means that we cannot allocate overall shares exactly but can obtain a range, depending on which order we draw them. Furthermore, we would like to know the part played by …nancial transmission as well as …nancial shocks. The Tables that follow examine the share of …nancial shocks and transmission ('…nancial factors') in the overall variances under two orderings of non-…nancial and other shocks.
P-values (%) Credit Model Non-Credit
Variances No Real
Total Incl.
Contribution of Shocks
Real Shocks Financial Factors var(Ỹ ) 0.0436 0.1174 37.1% var( ) 0.0026 0.0401 6.5% var(R) 0.0022 0.0175 11.4% We get a range of variance contributions of …nancial factors to the output gap variance of 37-74%; for in ‡ation of 6-29% and for interest rates of 6-11%. Summarising, we can say that typical crisis …nancial factors are an important source of output gap variance but less important for in ‡ation and interest rates.
Accounting for the Shocks in the Crisis Episode
We now turn to how the actual shocks we estimate to have occurred shaped the actual events of the crisis period. Apart from showing the e¤ect of each individual shock, we show the separate e¤ects of a) non-…nancial shocks only, with the credit channel blocked out (zero values for all credit parameters, a 2 = a 3 = k = b 2 = 0)-the red line b) non-…nancial shocks including the credit channel-the green line c) the whole model and all shocks -the blue line. b), green, minus a), red, shows the e¤ect of the credit channel working on the non-…nancial shocks alone; c), blue, minus b), green, shows the e¤ects of the …nancial shocks alone.
For the output gap, Figure 2 , we see that the credit channel has a small but distinct e¤ect; and that the …nancial shocks have a large e¤ect-also shown here in deep blue. After the …nancial shock, the main e¤ect comes from the supply shock in brown.
Figure 2: Shock Decomposition for Output During Crisis Period
When we turn to in ‡ation, Figure 3 , we …nd that neither the credit channel nor the …nancial shocks had much e¤ect. The main e¤ects are coming from the demand and the policy shocks, with almost all the rest coming from the supply shock (including movements in commodity prices). Notice that in so far as the …nancial shock a¤ects in ‡ation it raises it in 2008. 4-2009.3 , because in the model it acts as a cost push factor.
For interest rates, Figure 4 , the shock decomposition tells a story in which the demand shock's e¤ect on output pulls rates down from 2009.1 very sharply, but this e¤ect is counteracted by the upward push to in ‡ation imparted by the …nancial and supply shocks, which cause interest rates to rise. The fact that the …nancial shock raises interest rates seems puzzling until one notes that in this model higher …nancing charges act to raise production costs. We can set these results alongside those of Le, Meenagh and Minford (2012) who studied much the same US data using a version of the Smets-Wouters model with a credit channel of the Bernanke et al type and a ‡ex-price sector. They too found a large role for …nancial shocks and little for credit transmission on output. The role was proportionately smaller in theirs than here, because they also included non-stationary productivity shocks which dominate the movement of output in the crisis period. In their model …nancial shocks had a negative e¤ect on interest rates and this was balanced by a 'policy shock'due to the zero bound preventing rates from going as low as the Taylor Rule would have suggested; this di¤erence arises from funding costs not being part of production costs but rather being part of investment costs. Since the empirical performances of the Le et al model and the one here are similarly good, it is hard to distinguish these two causal transmission processes empirically, at least without further investigation. Otherwise the two models give broadly consistent accounts of the crisis.
Conclusion
We have compared the ability of the standard New Keynesian model and a version augmented with a credit channel to account for the behaviour of the US data over a sample period extending from the start of the 1980s up to and including the recent crisis period to the end of 2010. We found that both models could match this behaviour reasonably well even in their calibrated form; and once reestimated could do so quite easily. Of the two the credit-augmented version came much the closer to the data. When accordingly we used this credit model to account for the crisis period, we found that …nancial shocks played an important role in the banking crisis, accounting for up to two thirds of output gap variation. In other work on the banking crisis using a full DSGE model with a credit sector non-stationary productivity shocks were included, and these, with no connection to banking, acquired an equally important role in accounting for total output behaviour during the crisis. However, given that the model here excludes such non-stationary elements, it appears to be broadly in line with this other work. Clearly much work remains to be done on exactly what caused these, here exogenous, …nancial shocks. Nevertheless, the fact that such shocks can occur and that they can contribute to recessions should not be a surprise; nor is there necessarily any means to suppress such shocks, as seems to be the intention of such legislation as Dodd-Frank. The model here at least helps to establish the quantitative role of these shocks in the economy's behaviour during the crisis.
